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INTRODUCTION
Jonathan L. Entin*
Arguments about the proper role of the federal government
have been a staple of American political life. That topic was at the
core of the debate over ratification of the Constitution, and it re-
mains a central issue in contemporary politics.' Although the argu-
ments typically have a strong pragmatic aspect (e.g., whether pub-
lic policy is made more effectively at the state or local level than
at the national level), much of the debate explicitly invokes con-
stitutional values. This is neither surprising nor inappropriate, be-
cause the Constitution is more than "what the judges say it is." It
also provides the framework for our government and our politics.
In light of our "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,"3 we should expect our fundamental charter to figure in
public discourse. The Constitution, after all, is an important part of
our culture as well as of our law.4
At the same time, the proper role of the national government
has become the subject of litigation. That, too, should come as no
surprise to anyone familiar with Tocqueville's famous observation
that "[s]carcely any political question arises in the United States
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."5
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. Indeed, the key phrase in the title of this symposium, "The New Federalism," is a
hardy perennial. Proposals to limit the scope of the national government have gone under
that title for at least a quarter-century. See TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, NEw FEDERALISM: IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (1988); DAVID R. MAYHEW, Di-
VIDED WE GOVERN 90, 98 (1991).
2. ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 139 (1908), quoted in LOUIS
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 245 (1988).
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
4. See MIcHAEL KAMMEN, A MACmNE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF 381-400 (1986);
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTrrrIONAL FAITH 9-33 (1988).
5. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., 1945). I was going to say that every schoolchild has heard some
variation of this statement, but Professor Frickey persuaded me not to. See Philip P.
Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
A substantial proportion of the legal debate concerning federal
power has involved the Commerce Clause. Much of that debate
can be traced to Gibbons v. Ogden,6 the foundational case inter-
preting that provision. Chief Justice Marshall characterized congres-
sional power in this field as "plenary"7 and, in the same para-
graph, suggested that the judiciary had no role in constraining
federal authority.8 But a few pages later, Marshall conceded that
the states might have some power to regulate articles of commerce
before they became part of interstate or foreign commerce.9 The
Court struggled with the tensions implicit in Gibbons for more than
a century before the New Deal transformation ushered in a doctrin-
al structure suggesting that there were no judicially enforceable
limits on the commerce power.
Against this background, the decision last spring in United
States v. Lopez,"0 which invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990," came as a distinct surprise. The last case in which
the Court had struck down a federal statute under the Commerce
Clause was Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,'2 decided in 1936 at the
height of the constitutional conflict over the New Deal. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's majority opinion sought to harmonize the ruling
with six decades of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Both he and concurring Justice Kennedy noted several deficiencies
in the Gun-Free School Zones Act, including the absence of a
jurisdictional element linking the possession of a firearm within
1,000 feet of a school to interstate commerce, the omission of
congressional findings justifying federal regulation, and the primacy
of state authority over both education and street crime. Neverthe-
less, Lopez was widely viewed as a major development portending
significant change in constitutional doctrine. 3 Justice Thomas's
United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695, 696 n.10 (1996).
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
7. Id. at 197.
8. "The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are ... the sole restraints on
which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse." Id.
9. Id. at 203 (discussing state inspection laws, which "act upon the subject before it
becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it
for that purpose").
10. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
11. Crime Control Act of 1990, § 1702, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)).
12. 298 U.S. 238, 297-310 (1936).
13. For a summary of the commentary to this effect, by both supporters and critics of
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concurrence, calling for a return to the original understanding of a
much more limited commerce power, also implied the potential
significance of the case.
The notion that we might be seeing a resurgence of judicially
imposed limits on "big government" drew some support from the
Court's recent Tenth Amendment decisions. Although that provision
was dismissed as a mere "truism" more than fifty years before
Lopez in United States v. Darby,4 it seemed to take on new life
in National League of Cities v. Usery.5 Despite the demise of
National League of Cities a few years later in Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metropolitan Transit Authority,16 the impassioned dissents in
that case, and the recent decisions in Gregory v. Ashcroft" and
New York v. United States," suggest the continuing allure of
Court-policed federalism doctrines.
To explore the meaning and implications of Lopez, the Case
Western Reserve Law Review assembled more than a dozen distin-
guished legal scholars at a symposium held November 10 and 11,
1995. This issue contains the major papers and many of the com-
mentaries delivered there, as well as a student Comment addressing
one of the many federal statutes whose validity has been called
into question by the Lopez decision.
Robert F. Nagel, author of the first principal paper, expresses
skepticism that Lopez signals a major transformation in constitu-
tional doctrine. Professor Nagel says that the Court failed to apply
its announced substantial-effects test and that this failure has ex-
pansive rather than restrictive implications for federal power. Rath-
er than criticize the Court's apparent waffling, he suggests five
possible judicial responses to the interpretive problem presented by
a Constitution that purports to delegate only enumerated powers to
the federal government but includes some powers that are potential-
ly infmite if taken at all seriously. The actual results of recent
the idea, see Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 643,
643 (1996). See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Curb Federal Power to Subject States to
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (suggesting that Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (limiting congressional authority to abrogate states' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity) reflects continuation of the Court's rethinking of federalism
that began in Lopez).
14. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
15. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
16. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
17. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
18. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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decisions in a variety of areas imply that even the Court's conser-
vatives, despite some rhetorical bows in the direction of decentral-
ization, are not as committed to a radical reduction in federal au-
thority as many observers believe.
Commentaries by Jesse H. Choper, Melvyn R. Durchslag, and
Deborah Jones Merritt explore Lopez from a variety of perspec-
tives. Dean Choper finds vindication for his skepticism that the
judiciary can effectively police federalism disputes, while Professors
Durchslag and Merritt offer differing analyses of the possibilities
for more substantial doctrinal change.
The symposium turned next to the question of congressional
findings. Philip P. Frickey points out that the absence of such
findings was much more significant to the Fifth Circuit than to the
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion contains only
three sentences on the subject, and those say only that findings are
helpful but not mandatory. That is consistent with the Court's
general approach to the matter, in cases arising both before and
since the New Deal.
Cautioning against the prospect that legislative findings might
degenerate to the level of boilerplate, Professor Frickey neverthe-
less sees three uses for findings suggested by Lopez. First, Con-
gress might use findings to buttress the case for federal action by
articulating the applicable judicial standard and then demonstrating
how that standard has been satisfied through citation of facts gath-
ered in legislative hearings or other investigations. Second, congres-
sional findings might be used to satisfy "plain statement" rules
articulated by the Supreme Court in cases involving the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments. These findings would demonstrate a clear
legislative intent to regulate core state functions; their absence
would justify a narrow interpretation of a statute, not invalidation.
Third, findings might be a useful way to curb legislative excesses
relating to certain noneconomic regulations that have traditionally
been subject to rationality review.
The discussion, exemplified by the comments of Barry Fried-
man and Harold J. Krent, explored the value of findings for pro-
tecting the interests of state and local governments, and compared
the more stringent requirement of findings by administrative agen-
cies whose decisions are subject to judicial review.
Kathleen F. Brickey, author of the third principal paper, fo-
cused on a special feature of the Gun-Free School Zones Act: it
created a federal crime for conduct that was simultaneously an
offense under state law. Congress has federalized numerous state
[Vol. 46:635
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crimes. This trend seems to have accelerated in recent years, to the
dismay of the Judicial Conference of the United States and many
observers of the federal courts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has never invalidated such a statute and did not purport to do so in
Lopez, although Professor Brickey notes that judicial uneasiness
was not hard to discern in some of the opinions. She explores the
relationship between federal and state law in the case but, like
many other observers, cannot explain why the state authorities
dropped charges against Alphonso Lopez or why the federal prose-
cutor was so eager to pursue the case. Finally, she sees the Court's
refusal, in the wake of Lopez, to overturn rulings in several cases
raising Commerce Clause challenges to other federal criminal stat-
utes as evidence that the decision is intended primarily as a cau-
tionary message to Congress.
Much of the discussion following Professor Brickey's presen-
tation focused on precisely how the Gun-Free School Zones Act
might be amended to cure the defects the Court identified. Partici-
pants also explored in considerable detail other federal criminal
statutes that are likely to be challenged on Lopez grounds, which
led to consideration of possible constitutional limits on federalizing
crimes that have traditionally been handled at the state level and
on the rationales for creating new federal offenses.
The symposium concluded with an extended meditation by
Mark Tushnet on the potential ramifications of Lopez. Professor
Tushnet takes his inspiration from Bruce Ackerman's distinction
between ordinary politics and episodes of extraordinary popular
attention to fundamental issues of political theory and organization.
He asks whether Lopez might represent part of the beginning of
what Ackerman calls a constitutional moment. 9 Conceding that
the decision (even when considered in conjunction with contempo-
raneous political events) does not rise to that level, Tushnet none-
theless finds that Lopez could have much more sweeping conse-
quences than others predict. In particular, read in tandem with
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,'2 the decision goes to the
heart of the governmental transformation effected by the Recon-
struction Amendments. He suggests that the Court is actually less
concerned with the scope of the federal government than with its
structure, especially the pathologies produced by interest-group
19. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
20. 115 S. CL 2097 (1995).
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politics. The Court, from this perspective, finds such pathologies in
affirmative action programs that impose burdens on working-class
whites and in symbolic legislation like the Gun-Free School Zones
Act that simultaneously duplicates state laws and has little real
impact on school violence. Noting that Lopez was argued on the
day that Republicans won control of both houses of Congress for
the first time in forty years,2' Tushnet also sees the possibility of
an evaporation rather than a devolution of governmental authority.
In this, but perhaps not in much else, he agrees with Professor
Nagel that the current popular mood may be less one of support
for state and local governments than of hostility toward public au-
thority at all levels.
This paper provoked wide-ranging discussion, as the comments
by Larry Kramer and Suzanna Sherry indicate. The conversation
focused on theoretical issues raised by Ackerman's thesis and
Tushnet's analysis of the meaning of the New Deal transformation,
as well as on the larger significance of the Lopez decision. Con-
cerns were also raised about the implications for the future of
democratic politics in a society in which transnational private inter-
ests have the ability to avoid meaningful regulation or control by
any level of government.
This Law Review issue concludes with a Comment by Rebecca
Wistner, one of the Review's contributing editors. Her Comment
addresses the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act
of 1992' in light of Lopez. This statute imposes criminal sanc-
tions for willfully failing to pay child support when the child lives
in another state. Several district courts have considered this issue
and reached contradictory conclusions. Ms. Wistner analyzes the
arguments as well as the policies underlying the statute, concluding
that the Act passes constitutional muster but represents questionable
use of federal resources.
Finally, a word about one aspect of the symposium that is not
published here. To bring a more practical perspective to the delib-
erations, we asked U.S. Representative Thomas Sawyer to speak at
dinner on the program's first evening. Representative Sawyer has
no legal training but does participate in an informal House working
group on the Constitution. Of greater significance for present pur-
21. In making this observation, Professor Tushnet does not suggest that "th' supreme
court follows th' illiction returns." The Supreme Court's Decisions, in THE WORLD OF
MR. DOOLEY 86, 89 (Louis Filler ed., 1962).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
[Vol. 46:635
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poses, his unusual background gives him a unique perspective on
the issues raised by Lopez and the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
Now in his tenth year as a member of Congress, he previously
served as mayor of Akron, Ohio, and in the Ohio General Assem-
bly. Before seeking elective office, he was a secondary school
English teacher in Cleveland. One of his most memorable teaching
experiences was taking a loaded gun from one of his students
during class.
In short, the Case Western Reserve Law Review sought to put
together a comprehensive program addressing the major aspects of
Lopez. The two days of formal and informal discussion were re-
markably stimulating for all the participants. If the published pa-
pers bring some of that excitement to a larger audience, the Review
will count the project as an even larger success.

